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www.marinelink.com 27More generally, African pirate vio- lence comes across as casual violence, lack of restraint or, especially in the Gulf of Guinea, poor weapons discipline. A study by Risk Intelligence of 93 tanker hijackings in the Gulf of Guinea between 2010 and 2013 showed that the number of weapons discharges had increased, but had not caused a rise in casualties. Crew testimonies suggest that both in East and West Africa drug and alcohol abuse play a major role in attacker violence and er- ratic behaviour. As the above Þ gures for the Gulf of Guinea show, most casual- ties have involved security forces, and inshore incidents - not attacks on tran-siting foreign-ß agged vessels. Gulf of Guinea pirates are well armed, and often intimidating, but in terms of fatal attacks there is no reason for them to be singled out over pirates elsewhere. In the case of Gulf of Guinea ? or spe-ciÞ cally Nigerian ? pirates, there is the mantra that they will attack even when there is an embarked government securi-ty force team. This explanation exhibits a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of Nigerian pirates. They attack, and kill, because they are facing govern-ment security forces. The reason is that the pirates are the same youths who face both oppression and extortion by corrupt security forces in the Niger Delta. This combative attitude in the face of armed opposition is largely unique to Nigeria (or Nigerian pirates with a Niger Delta background) and not reß ective of gen- eral pirate behaviour in West Africa. It also suggests that embarking govern-ment security forces may not be as effec- tive in reducing the risks to crews as the embarkation of PCASP has been in the Indian Ocean.ConclusionWhatever the actual numbers of Ban-gladeshi Þ shermen killed, it is a good example of a speciÞ c local situation with unique drivers that are often overlooked by analyses on pirate violence which fo-cus on numbers and trends only in the context of international shipping. The local context provides explanations as to when and where ? and against whom ? violence can be expected and also as to the true potential for violence in any given region of the world. Pirate violence is an emotionally charged subject. Better understanding hinges on more accurate and compre-hensive reporting and informed analy-sis. It also requires a common under- standing of what constitutes ?violence?. Fear-mongering and perpetuation of unfounded myths are unhelpful in alle-viating anxieties amongst seafarers and in preparing them for dealing with the problem. Security companies and specialized media in particular have a responsibility to not stoke the ß ames for fear of losing relevance. Often as not, good security advice constitutes what enables clients to make sound commercial decisions and protect their crews more effectively when based on the most objective facts available.The AuthorDirk Steffen is the Director Maritime Se- curity for Risk Intelligence. He has been covering the Gulf of Guinea as a mari- time security consultant and analyst since 2004.e: ds@riskintelligence.eu w: www.riskintelligence.eu t: +45 70 266330 MR #8 (26-33).indd 27MR #8 (26-33).indd 278/4/2014 11:43:53 AM8/4/2014 11:43:53 AM
