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Government Update container itself will be examined. The goal is to quick- ly segregate cargo into general and high-risk cate- gories, so that general cargo can be processed rapidly. Additionally, the Customs Service relies on intelli- gence reports, suspicious trading patterns, suspect paperwork, and reports from government agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, to determine which con- tainers and other cargo should be subjected to increased scrutiny. Cargo Inspections Abroad Suspect containers scheduled to shipment to the United States are being identified before they leave the foreign country under two current programs: the Con- tainer Security Initiative (CSI) and the U.S.-Canada Smart Border Plan. Under the CSI, U.S. Customs Service personnel are scheduled to be stationed (at the time of this writing) at the ports of Singapore, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Le Havre, Bremerhaven, and Hamburg. The U.S. Customs Ser- vice personnel work alongside the host country cus- toms officials to target and pre-screen U.S.-bound cargo containers before those containers are loaded on the ship. The U.S. Customs Service hopes to develop agreements with the top 20 mega-ports involved in the U.S.-foreign trade so as to expedite the majority of such shipments. Controversy has arisen because some smaller ports are concerned that they will be placed at a competitive disadvantage, not having U.S. Customs Service personnel on site. The United States and Canada have developed a bi- lateral approach because so much cargo bound for one country arrives from overseas initially in a port of the other country. Thus, U.S. Customs Service personnel are assigned to various Canadian ports and personnel from the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency are assigned to various U.S. ports. The ports currently involved in the Smart Border Program are Newark and Seattle in the U.S. and Vancouver, Halifax, and Mon- treal in Canada. The U.S. Government recently proposed to the Inter- national Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized agency of the United Nations, that port states be autho- rized to stop and examine ships on the high seas when those ships are bound for a port of the port state. Risk Reduction The U.S. Customs Service, along with numerous other federal agencies, is working to reduce the risk that terrorists will attack the United States by means of cargo shipped in international commerce. Increasing use is being made of intelligence-gathering through a wide variety of sources so as to identify potential prob- lems before they manifest themselves. Two problems with such intelligence relate to data overload and qual- ity. As the volume of intelligence information increas- es, it becomes difficult to distinguish between routine information (with its usual random variations) and information relating to actual threats. The quality of intelligence information varies drastically. Some is highly specific and accurate; much of it is vague; and some is totally erroneous. Acting on inaccurate intelli- gence information, as when the U.S. Customs Service requires an arriving vessel to 'pull' specific containers Containership CMA-CGM Balzac, which was built by Hanjin Heavy Industries, could soon face stiffer security measures when com- ing in and out of ports. for detailed inspection even though the containers are not scheduled for offloading at that port, leaves every- one involved frustrated and encourages a lack of respect for the maritime security mission. The Advance Manifest Filing initiative proposed by the U.S. Customs Service on August 8, 2002 has the potential to drastically change operational methods for all parties involved in U.S.-foreign trade. Under this initiative, if adopted, vessels carrying any cargo bound for the United States would be prohibited from loading the cargo onboard until 24 hours after they had sub- mitted their manifest to the U.S. Customs Service for review. The concept is that the Customs Service would then have time to identify suspect cargoes and prevent their loading until thorough examination could be made. Doubts have been raised about whether the U.S. Customs Service could actually process in a timely manner the thousands of manifests it would receive daily. Additional concerns have been raised respecting non-containerized cargo, the role of non-vessel-operat- ing common carriers (NVOCCs), freight remaining onboard for delivery to another port, and trade disloca- tion due to disparate treatment, among other things. International commerce has become increasingly time- sensitive. In many cases, cargo is not delivered until several hours before the vessel is due to depart. Obvi- ously, the vessel's manifest cannot be prepared until the cargo has been delivered and the accompanying bill of lading presented. Time is money and the time lost in compliance with the proposed rule will be costly. The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is intended to provide shippers, carriers, intermediaries, and others involved in U.S.-foreign trade with an incentive to improve supply chain secu- rity. Businesses participating in this voluntary pro- gram agree to conduct a comprehensive self-assess- ment of supply chain security using C-TPAT guide- lines, submit a supply chain security profile to Cus- toms, develop and implement a supply chain security program, and communicate C-TPAT guidelines to other companies with which they have relationships. In return, participants may have a reduced number of Customs inspections when their cargoes arrive in the United States and access to the C-TPAT membership list, among other things. Operation Safe Commerce is a more intense version of C-TPAT. Under this Operation, a container is spe- (Continued on page 23) WHEN ACCURACY COUNTS Two high performance thickness / corrosion gauges for 'testing through one side, on a variety of marine applications. 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