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Government Update catastrophic emergency, and describe the training, drills, and anti-terrorism actions of persons on the ship to deter a catastrophic emergency. The plan would have to be approved by the USG. In other words, having a security plan that meets interna- tional requirements and is approved by the flag administration would, as it was for oil spill response plans under OPA 90. be insufficient for voyages to the United States. It should be noted that, under the current bill, this anti-terrorism plan would only be required of those vessels that the United States believes might be involved in a cata- strophic emergency. The discretion of the federal government is not otherwise fettered in this regard by the current bill. What You Don't Know — May Hurt You Another worrisome provision would prohibit a vessel from loading for export from the United States cargo for which the exporter has not submit- ted to the USG all the documentation that the Gov- ernment wants. The problem is: how is the master to know if that has been done by the exporter to the satisfaction of the USG? Even today, when the USG is demanding less paperwork than it is expected to require in the near future, problems arise with export documents and ships are occa- sionally required to return cargoes (that were prop- erly loaded) so that the U.S. Customs Service can reexamine them or take other action. There simply is no way for a master to know whether an exporter has submitted to the USG all documents that may be required and whether each of those documents are fully and accurately completed. It's one thing to place a burden on the party responsible for accomplishing a task. It is quite another thing to place a burden on a party who has no such obliga- tion and no effective means of ensuring that the party with the obligation actually does what is required. Would the government prosecute a taxi cab driver or the taxi company for carrying a bank robber from the scene of the crime when the driver had no knowledge that the bank had even been robbed? The bill will apparently require international shipping containers being shipped to the United States to meet certain standards and to be equipped with such things as tamper-proof seals. Unless there is a clear and obvious method of determining whether a particular container is in compliance with these standards, it would be both unfair and inappropriate to place a burden on the ship opera- tor or the master regarding the propriety of bring- ing such container to a U.S. port. And the burden may relate to more than just containers bound for the United States. A container being carried to another nation on a ship that is making an interme- diate port call in the U.S. is as potentially danger- ous as one actually destined for the U.S. This dilemma highlights the international nature of the problem and why an international, multinational, uniform solution is required. Another potential threat not fully addressed in the bill relates to use of a ship as a weapon. While cer- tain vessels, such as LNG carriers, will continue to face heightened scrutiny, those are probably not the ones that would be used in a terrorist attack. Secu- rity on attractive ships, such as LNG carriers and cruise ships, has already been enhanced. The like- ly ships that might be used as weapons are small freighters, such as those allegedly owned by A1 Qaeda, which will, if the legislation is a guide, receive little scrutiny from the Coast Guard and other federal agencies in the absence of intelli- gence information. All that would be required is to load such a small freighter with a legitimate cargo of fertilizer (as was done in Oklahoma City), sail it into a major port such as San Francisco, and deto- nate it near a vital structure such as the Golden Gate Bridge. These potentials are not cited to engender unneeded concern or to provide a terrorist blue- print. but merely to emphasize that the terrorist threat is many-faceted and requires a broad-based solution. While there are roles for national govern- ments, as well as local governments (e.g., first responders), the private sector, and the crews of individual ships, there is also a major role to be played by international organizations, such as the IMO. The greatest danger facing the United States if it insists on undertaking all of the unilateral measures contained in the bills under consideration is that it will lose the support of the international communi- ty, with the possible result that there is no interna- tional convention on maritime security. The U.S. Congress will do itself, and the American people, a disservice if it ignores the proper role of the IMO with respect to maritime security and continues in its more extreme unilateral efforts. FOR SOME VERY GOOD REASONS THE HAMMAR H20 HYDROSTATIC RELEASE UNIT IS KEEPING YOU AFLOAT IS OUR BUSINESS Phone +46 31 709 65 50. Fax +46 31 49 70 23 info@cmhammar.com. www.cmhammar.com Circle 288 on Reader Service Card or visit www.maritimereporterinfo.com New SOLAS Regulations Go Into Effect Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) affecting many aspects of ship safety go into effect on July 1. including a new revised SOLAS chapter on fire pro- tection. fire detection and fire extinction, amendments to chapters II-1, IX and X (to make a new High- Speed Craft Code mandatory) and record of equipment attached to safety certificates. A revised SOLAS chapter 11-2 (Construction - Fire protection, fire detection and fire extinction) enters into force, which also makes a new International Code for Fire Safety Systems (FSS Code) mandato- ry. The revised chapter was developed over eight years by the Sub-Committee on Fire Protection and provides an entirely new structure for SOLAS chapter 11-2 which may better accommodate the way port and flag States and ship designers deal with fire safety issues in the future. The new structure focuses on the "fire scenario process" rather than on ship type, as the previous SOLAS chapter 11-2 was structured. Thus, the regulations start with prevention, detection, and suppression following all the way through to escape. In addition, to make the revised SOLAS chapter II-2 more user-friendly, specific system-related technical requirements have been moved to the new International Fire Safety Systems Code and each regulation has a purpose statement and functional requirements to assist port and flag States. 16 Maritime Reporter & Engineering News HAMMAR" Hammar H20 secured to llferaft cradle and attached to llferaft lashing with clipbook. Painter line shackled to weakllnk and strong rope with single point connector. Red weakllnk breaks and survivors can board the inflated lifers ft. Revised model with a single point iminottot for painter Mne Simple to Install, safe and has a more effective construction It nseds no service or maintenance Fits aH Hfenrfts & EPIRBs of ail shapes and sizes It's approved by most shipping authorities
