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14 • MarineNews • March, 2006 LEGAL BEAT By Jeanne M. Grasso Over the last ten or so years, criminal prosecutions have become commonplace in the maritime industry. The most com- mon prosecutions stem from environmen- tal violations, but often also include charges of false statements, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice. Over the last several years, however, a new trend has begun - that of prosecutions under the Seaman's Manslaughter Statute. These prosecutions have come to the fore because of the Staten Island Ferry inci- dent, which occurred in 2003, where the Seaman's Manslaughter Statute was used to extract guilty pleas from the pilot and a shoreside official. History of the Seaman's Manslaughter Statute. Since the origin of steamboats in the early 1800s, thousands of passengers died from boiler explosions and fires, which plagued this class of vessel. States began to step in and regulate steamboats, but the effort was disjointed and ineffec- tive. The death of Senator Josiah Johnson in a steamboat explosion prompted Presi- dent Andrew Jackson, in his 1833 State of the Union address, to make steamboat safety a federal priority. In 1838, Congress passed "An act to provide for the better security of the lives of passengers aboard vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam" (the "1838 Act"). The 1838 Act set forth various licensing, inspection, and safety require- ments for steamboats. The focus of the 1838 Act, however, was to demand the "utmost vigilance of the crew by attaching criminal liability for fatal lapses." According to the legislative history, the 1838 Act was designed to punish captains, engineers, and pilots of steamboats for their negligence or inattention related to vessel operations. The 1838 Act did not go far enough, and by 1852 over 7,000 people had died on steamboats. Congress realized that the technology was part of the problem and that imposing criminal liability on the crewmembers was not an effective solu- tion. In 1852, another steamboat safety law was enacted (the "1852 Act"), which imposed various safety equipment requirements, including hydrostatic test- ing, safety valves, lifeboats, life pre- servers, and firefighting equipment. Steamboat-related deaths decreased dra- matically after enactment of the 1852 Act, which largely provided the basis for the U.S. Coast Guard inspection regime as we know it today. The Seaman's Manslaughter Statute. The Seaman's Manslaughter Statute gen- erally criminalizes misconduct, negli- gence, or inattention to duties by a cap- tain, engineer, pilot, charterer, owner, operator, or other person employed on or responsible for managing any vessel. It provides for fines and imprisonment of up to ten years. The elements of the crime are that: (1) the defendant was [captain, pilot, opera- tions manager, etc.] of the vessel; (2) the defendant was guilty of misconduct, neg- ligence, or inattention to his duties on the vessel; and (3) that by reason of such mis- conduct, negligence, or inattention, some- one died. Over the last few years, the Sea- man's Manslaughter Statute has been used to convict not only crewmembers, but also shoreside personnel involved with vessel operations. It is important to note that intent is not an element of the offense and it is not necessary to show that the acts or omissions that caused the death were will- ful or intentional. In fact, in most juris- dictions where the statute has been uti- lized, simple negligence is enough to secure a conviction, save for in Florida, which requires gross negligence. Until recently, prosecutions under the Seaman's Manslaughter Statute were a rare event. Recent high-profile casualties, however, have given the statute a new life. Over the last several years, it has been used to convict not only crewmembers, but also shoreside personnel who are 4 E M P &