independent of each other on the same
ship, and as a result, that was making it
really hard for us to get our avails done
well. And so now we’re integrating
those much better. Doing maintenance
and modernization requires good solid
planning and contracting. We will con-
tinue to have to balance how much mod-
ernization we can afford, but the life-
cycle maintenance has got to be done.”
Hilarides says that as NAVSEA and the
Navy strive to institute a culture of judi-
ciousness and affordability, commonal-
ity is part of that equation.
“Why do we have 247,000 types of
valves on ships? If there’s a valve we
repair every quarter, that valve should
be common across every ship in the fl eet
so that we get the economies of scale for
production and repair. If that valve nev-
er gets repaired in the 35 years of a ship’s
life but once, commonality doesn’t mat-
ter. We’ll pay that one-time cost to go do
that repair. We work on air conditioning
plants all the time and we have a LOT
of different air conditioning plants on all
our ships. So they’re a perfect target for
a commonality initiative,” he says. “We
can get economies in acquisition, train-
ing, repair and operations.”
Hilarides has created a new position on
his staff, the director of acquisition and
commonality. “We’ve stood up a direc-
torate, and they’re on the trail of some
really good things, including fi nding ex-
amples where we have one spec for pro-
duction of a valve that gets interpreted
by ten different organizations, both in-
side my life lines and out, such that the
valve manufacturer produces 10 differ-
ent packages, paperwork packages, to go
with the valve he manufactures exactly
the same way. There’s savings in that.
So we’re going after that. I think Rear
Adm. Tom Kearney and his team are off
on the right track.”
Balancing Capability & Affordability
Affordability is directly related to
requirements, and managing risk, Hi-
larides says. “In our culture of afford-
ability, we have good, hard requirements
discussions with the Pentagon. Over the
years, I’ve looked at requirements and
acquisition as a partnership. There are
checks and balances in that. Not every
requirement is a good requirement. With
early requirements, changes are very
easy, while late requirements have to
be a very high standard,” he says. “We
have to go make sure we’re having the
right conversation with our requirements
authorities—of which there are many—
to make sure we have the right cost and
capability balance for what we deliver.”
“When we talk through the require-
ments, we have to look at the cost,” Hi-
larides says. “If you have to be able to
make 8 knots with moderate battle dam-
age, there’s a couple of ways you can do
it. You can take the propulsion train—
the diesels, shafts, and the screws— and
put them into that full MILSPEC hard-
ened, no-matter-what-you-do-to-‘em,
they’ll still work. Or, you go build an
armored box in the front, far away from
the rest of the propulsion system, with
an 8-knot outboard motor that you can
lower down after that damage event, and
still meet the 8-knot requirement. We’ve
spent a lot of time on that. It really
makes people uncomfortable; they’re
like, “Whoa! You put the propulsion
train on a commercial standard? It’s still
very survivable, because commercial
ship operators don’t want their ships to
fail if they hit the bottom or get hit hard
by a tug. Still fairly good, but you invest
in protecting the emergency gear. That’s
the conversation that’s going on: which
parts of the ship do you not want to get
destroyed by a missile? The magazines;
command and control structures; your
well deck so that you can continue to get
the Marines off or back on in that 8-knot
transit out there?”
“It’s actually probably the best ship de-
sign discussion we’ve had in a very long
time, inside the government,” he says.
“When we decided to take LCS 1 and
2 and deliver them as ships of the fl eet
long before the design was mature, we
actually intended them to be engineering
development models, to go learn, and
get them wet,’ so that we design the right
class of ships in the long term. Once
we owned them, we chose to deploy the
fi rst ship early,” he says. “There’s some
risk in that. If it were an airplane, you
wouldn’t deploy EDM airplanes. We
deployed an EDM ship. It did a pretty
good job. It met the fl eet commander’s
need for ships out in that part of the
world, and did a good job of showing the
US fl ag. But it had some problems, and
we seemed to have spent a lot of time
apologizing about that. Well, we did
exactly what we said we would do. We
took the ship, pushed it to the front as
fast as possible, and learned a lot.”
By comparison, Hilarides points to the
Virginia-class submarine. “We took sev-
en years of requirements trades; seven
years of design; and seven years of con-
struction to get the fi rst ship out. When
it went to sea it was in pretty good shape.
But Hawaii and Missouri were much
improved compared to the fi rst two, Vir-
ginia and Texas.”
“With LCS, we chose to accelerate that
process. We took just a couple years of
design; went to production early – we
took a lot of risk there; and deployed
early,” Hilarides says. “Until you sail
it all the way across the Pacifi c Ocean,
you don’t really know how it will work.
We tried a new maintenance model out
in Singapore, and learned a lot, and as
a result of that, follow-on ships will be
better and better, and the learning curve
is much accelerated from what it would
have been under a traditional process.
“We take some risk to provide excep-
tional ships at an affordable price, and
we don’t always hit the mark,” he says.
“But that’s not to say we shouldn’t take
any risk in our new developments. So
getting that balance right is important.”
Why do we have 247,000
types of valves on ships?
If there’s a valve we repair every
quarter, that valve should be com-
mon across every ship in the fl eet
so that we get the economies of
scale for production and repair.
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