Shipping Funds
(continued, from page 8)
and disciplined enough to exclude
from calculation the interesting
but irrelevant information flooding
in.
The consequences of having
bought "in error" are all framed in
terms of probabilities. Since the
future is uncertain, it is possible
that the purchase will in fact turn
out well. More likely, the market
conditions prevailing at the time of
the purchase will impose a burden
on the particular transaction that
will be difficult to overcome, doom-
ing the vessel to sub-par perfor-
mance.
Similar logic applies to ship
sales. The markets alone signal
the proper time to sell a ship. But
in addition to the task of interpret-
ing market indications — which
are often not obvious — there are
two other forces that are often in
conflict with the market sell sig-
nals.
The first conflicting force is pri-
marily psychological. Shipowners
want to own ships, and they often
continue to own ships until long
after the market has said that it is
time to sell them. The losses so
incurred will often substantially
reduce the return from the owner-
ship of the vessel.
The second force, when it exists,
is a true conflict of interest. Many
organizers of, and sometimes
investors in, shipping funds are
shipowners or managers. Often,
the organizer will manage the
investors' fleet — for a fee. While
the ship management fee is cer-
tainly a legitimate cost of doing
business, it also reaps profits for
the manager and can conflict with
the manager's obligation to
investors. The management fee
will be paid regardless of how well
or how poorly a ship is faring and
can surely be an inducement not to
sell a ship which can be sold.
While the amount of the manage-
ment fee may seem small, it should
be kept in mind that the manager
may already have an organization
to manage his or her own fleet, and
the incremental cost of managing
the investors' fleet may be close to
zero, so that the management fee
may represent a sizable profit
increment. In the past, unhappy
investors have ruefully referred to
management fees as the insurance
that fund sponsors use to under-
write their own profit.
This completes the description of
the three economically harmful
types of events mentioned earlier,
but still leaves the question of how
they are to be avoided.
Three fundamental changes in
the way that "shipping funds" are
organized will greatly improve the
chances of reaching high rates of
return. First, the management of
the fleet should be divorced com-
pletely from the process by which
decisions to sell and buy ships are
made. Ideally, this means that a
ship management company not
affiliated with any of the investors
or the fund organizer would be
hired to run the ships. At the very
least, the investors should insist
that buy and sell decisions not be
made unilaterally by the ship man-
ager.
Second, rather than first accumu-
lating a large pool of money and
then finding ships to buy, funds
should be raised and committed on
a ship-by-ship basis. This removes
pressure from unemployed capital
that often contributes to poor buy-
ing decisions. In practice, this
requires commitments from
investors to furnish cash when
needed. Admittedly, this technique
moves the pressure to invest from
the fund back to the investors. An
investor may in fact decide not to
contribute for a particular ship
" .... ••••
- :• « AS* _ .j•gjp'S)
- •— —
^ /f
* v
Digital Wave Publishing